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Men’s actions are subject to general, immutable laws expressed by
statistics. In what, then, consists man’s responsibility before society,
the concept of which follows from the consciousness of man’s
freedom? That is a question for jurisprudence.1
—Leo Tolstoy
Freedom and statistical certainty make for tense bedfellows, as Leo Tolstoy
gamely noted in his ambitious epilogue to War and Peace.2 As science
progresses in understanding the world of action and reaction, the justice system,
rooted in theories of punishment as old as human civilization, must be analyzed
continuously in light of new scientific reality. A collision that threatens to rock
our criminal system of justice looms as a stark possibility: how do we square a
deterministic account of human behavior—one in which every person’s actions
are foreordained and unchangeable—with a criminal system that holds people
accountable for their crimes?
In August 2012, the journal Science plumbed this problem directly when it
published a study documenting the sentences imposed by 181 state court judges
confronted at the sentencing stage of a hypothetical criminal proceeding with
evidence of biomechanical predisposition to psychopathy.3 The judges faced
the case of a convicted murderer who argued that his genetic makeup


Litigation Associate, Venable LLP. Formerly a trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Division, and law clerk to the Honorable Robert L. Hinkle, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida.
1. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE, 1202 (Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, trans.,
2007).
2. Id.
3. Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or
Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths? 337 SCIENCE 846, 846 (2012).
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predisposed him to violent crime.4 The study was loosely based on the
sentencing of Stephen Anthony Mobley who, after his conviction for murder,
argued he should be tested for a genetic mutation that might explain his crime.5
In the study, a subset of the judges reviewed brain scans and expert testimony
that the defendant’s criminal behavior was caused not by an act of volition, but
by the chemical composition of his brain.6 The study, entitled The DoubleEdged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of
Psychopaths?, found that such evidence significantly affected the sentences
those judges imposed.7
The judges overwhelmingly found the evidence of a biomechanical cause of
the crime to be a mitigating factor, leading to more lenient sentences when
compared to the sentences imposed by judges presented with no such evidence.8
The judges presented with evidence of the criminal’s mental predisposition
imposed sentences that were, on average, 1.1 years shorter for the same crime.9
Though the judges rated the criminal to have a high legal and moral
responsibility and free will under both versions of the facts, the differing
sentences suggest that the judges’ intuitions regarding the freedom of a
criminal’s behavior played a significant role in their judgments concerning his
blameworthiness.10 Confronted with evidence of aberrant brain composition,
the judges presumably believed that the criminal’s act was less blameworthy
because his free will was less than the average person’s.11
The article’s reference to a “double-edged sword” denotes the potential that
evidence like the kind presented in the study could influence judges in opposing
directions concerning blameworthiness.12 From a retributive standpoint—
concerned with the proper deserts fitting a crime—evidence that the crime was
caused by something other than the criminal’s free choice constitutes mitigating
evidence.13 However, from a utilitarian standpoint—concerned with future
dangerousness—a predisposition toward crime seems to weigh in favor of
incarceration as a method of incapacitation.14 While this article focuses more
on the retributive side of this equation, it is helpful to keep these countervailing
concerns in mind. The study makes clear that the judges’ convictions regarding

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.; see also Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66 (Ga. 1995).
Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 846.
Id. at 847–48.
Id.
Id. at 846
Id. at 847.
Id. at 847–48.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 848.
Id.
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the blameworthiness of a criminal’s action is in some way tied to their judgments
concerning his freedom of will.15
This makes sense within the criminal law, since seldom is an action, referred
to as the actus reus, alone sufficient to render an act criminal.16 To qualify as a
crime, that act must be accompanied by a culpable mental state, called the mens
rea.17 While questions of determinism may seem, at first blush, to involve the
mens rea component of the criminal act, in actuality, much of the discussion of
free will and determinism focuses on whether a certain act is voluntary.18 The
Seventh Circuit underscored the essential nature of voluntariness in United
States v. Cullen, when it noted:
In the narrowest sense, every crime must be the product of defendant’s
free will; it must reflect his choice to perform the criminal act. If the
act itself was the result of a mere reflex, or muscular spasm, or was
caused by physical duress or compulsion, even the narrowest intent
would be absent and the defendant would be innocent of crime;
indeed, it could be said that he did not act at all.19
There seems to be little room for disagreement that a spasm is neither a
morally ascribable act, nor the ground for criminal sanction. Scaling up from
this intuitive truth, why shouldn’t the same be said of the acts of a person with
an aberrant brain composition predisposing him to commit a crime?20 And if
physical determinism is true, and all human actions are caused by forces outside
of human control, then perhaps no human action is properly morally
ascribable.21 This presents a considerable problem for the justification and
administration of criminal punishments.22
Defendants have often sought to inject the kind of causal arguments noted
above into criminal trials—sometimes as a mitigating factor, sometimes as an
affirmative defense, and sometimes to defeat the prosecution’s case-in-chief.23
Such evidence appeals to a common moral intuition: it seems unjust to punish

15. Id. at 847–48.
16. Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545,
1548–49 (2013) (discussing the fundamental importance of both actus reus and mens rea to
criminal culpability).
17. Id.
18. See Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1411–12
(2011).
19. United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1971).
20. See Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66 (Ga. 1995) (discussing the defendant’s motion
“seeking funds for expert witnesses to conduct preliminary testing . . . ‘suggest[ing] a possible
genetic basis for violent and impulsive behavior in certain individuals.’”).
21. See Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 847.
22. See, e.g., Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66.
23. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (1985);
see generally Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride? 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616–17 (1988).
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someone for a harm he did not cause, or one that was outside of his control.24 If
a person’s criminal act is caused not by free choice, but by brain composition or
the irresistible push of a strong gust of wind, it seems unlikely that a jury would
hold such a person criminally liable—such an action is not morally ascribable to
the actor.25 The study in Science seems to confirm such a belief is widespread
amongst state court judges, who are responsible for much of criminal sentencing
in the United States.26
Though little in the Science study may be revolutionary,27 it elegantly raises
the tension felt within the law between beliefs in physical determinism and in
human free will.28 How can we punish a criminal who was predetermined by
causes outside his control to commit a crime?29 Is such a person really
blameworthy? These questions implicate strong intuitions and have been
debated for millennia.30 Going further, if showing that a criminal’s crimes are
attributable, at least in part, to factors outside of his control leads to a lesser
punishment, then what if science eventually demonstrates that all people are
similarly determined by factors outside of their control? Must the criminal law
simply collapse, or perhaps take on a solely utilitarian cast, relinquishing any
retributive basis?31 The purpose of this Article is to propose that, even granting
incompatibility between hard physical determinism32 and a robust sense of
human free will, the criminal justice system can be established on a footing that
remains uncommitted to either alternative without being internally inconsistent.
This debate thrusts into the arena of criminal law what Leo Tolstoy faced in
the historical realm when he wrote in the concluding epilogue of War and Peace:
If we examine a man alone, without his relation to everything around
him, his every action appears free to us. But if we see at least some
relation to what is around him. Is we see his connection with anything
whatever—with the man who is talking to him, with the book he is
reading, with the work he is doing, even with the air that surrounds
him, even with the light that falls on things around him—we see that
24. Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice,
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L. J. 719, 730–31 (1991–1992).
25. Id.
26. See Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 847–48.
27. See Denno, supra note 23, at 633–39 (describing studies of neurophysiological
abnormalities in criminals and their use in court).
28. See, e.g., Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the
Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 33–35 (2005).
29. The literature confronting this question is large and varied in its approach to the problem.
See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 24, at 730.
30. See generally DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL vii–x (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997) (discussing
historical background of the problem of free will and determinism) [hereinafter FREE WILL].
31. Moore, supra note 23, at 1094 (suggesting, but ultimately rejecting such a scheme).
32. Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 846 (defining “biological determinism” as “the idea that once
we know something about an individual’s genes or brain, we can predict or explain his or her
behavior”).
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each of these conditions has an influence on him and guides at least
one side of his activity. And insofar as we see these influences, so far
our notion of his freedom decreases and our notion of the necessity he
is subject to increases.33
If a human being is determined by events outside his control, and is not an
independent actor, then how can we hold such a being responsible for his
choices? While many would argue that such an inconsistency is illusory,34 if we
push that dispute aside and grant that there is no room for moral responsibility
in a deterministic world, then what form should our system of criminal law take?
This Article differs from those works that have proposed there really is no
inconsistency between free will and determinism and that our legal system need
not confront such problem because the problem itself is illusory.35 Nor does this
article join those works that advocate accepting incompatibility between free
will and determinism by instituting a moderated, but ultimately incoherent,
system of criminal justice.36 Rather, this Article argues that, beginning from
widely accepted notions of a right to self-defense, a criminal justice system can
be fashioned from the concept of “weak retributivism” proposed by Daniel
Farrell.37 This is a concept that is palatable to both those who believe in human
free will to the exclusion of physical determinism and to those who believe in
physical determinism to the exclusion of human free will.38 If it can cater to
such “incompatibilists,”39 then such a system should also be acceptable to
compatibilists, who believe that there is no true inconsistency between moral
agency and physical determinism.40
Part I of this Article briefly sketches the problem of free will and determinism
as it relates to criminal punishment and discusses the discomfort many in the
administration of the criminal law feel to physical determinism. Part II examines
the Durham test of insanity as an area where the conflict between free will and
determinism has had a concrete impact on the criminal justice system. Part III
suggests an alternative ground for criminal punishment, based on Daniel
Farrell’s “weak retributivism,”41 that can function regardless of whether humans
have the free will required for moral responsibility. Part IV presents a general
outline of how such a system might look and how it might differ from our current

33. TOLSTOY, supra note 1, at 1205.
34. See Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and
Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 600–01 (2005).
35. See id.
36. See Cotton, supra note 28, at 5.
37. See Daniel M. Farrell, The Justification of General Deterrence, 94 PHIL. REV. 367, 368
(1985).
38. DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 1–3 (2001) [hereinafter LIVING
WITHOUT FREE WILL].
39. Id. at 1.
40. See Moore, supra note 23, at 1121.
41. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 368.
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system of punishment. Part V concludes with a look at how current theories of
excuse might survive within such a system.
Rather than arguing for a specific metaphysical account and constructing a
system of criminal law that is compatible with that account, this Article seeks to
propose a system of criminal law that is independent of the various accounts of
free will and determinism noted throughout this paper. This attempt is Rawlsian
in its cast: the system suggested in this Article does not rely on robust notions of
moral agency dependent on human free will.42 As Rawls sought to construct his
political philosophy on as general a metaphysical grounds as possible,43 so too
this Article seeks to explore a plausible system of justice consistent with equally
plausible metaphysical theories. This Article neither assumes nor argues for
determinism. Rather, it argues that, contrary to the widespread belief that any
robust system of criminal justice must have as its presupposition human free
will, the punishment of criminals can be justified without reliance on a picture
of human free will subject to being undermined by a theory of physical
determinism. While this system must be grounded on some suppositions, they
are of a general enough character to appeal to most plausible metaphysical
accounts, which is as it should be. In a pluralistic society such as ours, our
institutions, including our institutions of justice, should be founded on the most
widely acceptable, functional basis that can be found.
I. FOUNDATIONAL FREE WILL
When Abraham Lincoln described the United States as a nation “dedicated to
the proposition that all men are created equal,”44 he identified a proposition he
believed foundational to American society. Lincoln did not say all men are, in
fact, created equal; rather, Lincoln identified the belief in and dedication to
equality as essentially American.45 Fyodor Dostoevsky illustrated a similar
dedication when he said, “[i]f anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside
the truth, and if the truth really did exclude Christ, I should prefer to stay with
Christ and not with truth.”46 Human equality was undermined by the institution
of slavery, yet Lincoln nonetheless urged his countrymen to hold to equality to
realize a more perfect Union. Dostoevsky wrestled with doubt, and yet he
resolved he would hold with his faith even if the object of his belief proved false.
Within American jurisprudence, particularly within our system of criminal
justice, there is a similar foundational belief that undergirds our system: the
42. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 223, 240 n.22 (1985).
43. Id.
44. Abraham Lincoln: Gettysburg Address, https://www.greatamericandocuments.com/spee
ches/lincoln-gettysburg/, (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
45. Id.
46. Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Mrs. N.D. Fonvizin (1854) in Ethel Golburn Mayne,
trans., LETTERS OF FYODOR MICHAILOVITCH DOSTOEVSKY TO HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS 71, 67–
68 (1914).
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belief in human responsibility and moral agency founded on an assumption that
humans possess free will. While there is much debate on the proper definition
of free will,47 at its most stripped-down, it is a belief that humans are moral
agents with the ability to guide their actions without being externally
determined.48 As science has gained a wider and more comprehensive
understanding of the physical world, arguments that humans are no more free of
the laws of nature than a rock or tree have increased.49 Our world, the belief
runs, is determined by physical laws and the state of physical matter at any given
time; a complete picture of both would allow us to predict every future state of
the universe, including human action.50
American jurisprudence has resisted recognizing such physical determinism
because of its possible consequences for criminal law. Most people would find
it absurd to hold a meteor that crashes into a home morally accountable for the
destruction it wreaks. Likewise, we look backward with puzzlement at the
medieval practice of trying animals for crimes.51 But if humans, like rocks and
animals, are simply prey to the laws of nature with no real autonomy, then why
should we treat them any differently? The retributive theories of punishment
underlying our system support holding a person responsible for his actions just
because he chose those actions, and threatens to fall apart if the law recognizes
that human action is ordained by physical laws rather than a robust freedom of
will.
This fear, the fear of the collapse of the grounds for holding people criminally
liable for their actions, can be seen rising to the surface of American
jurisprudence within individual court opinions:
47. See LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 1–3 (exploring various historical
definitions of free will); see generally FREE WILL, supra note 30, at vii–x (discussing historical
background of the problem of free will and determinism).
48. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 114-15 (1986). Cf. FREE WILL, supra note 30, at
233.
[Free will] presents itself initially as the belief that antecedent circumstances, including
the condition of the agent, leave some of the things we will do undetermined: they are
determined only by our choices, which are motivationally explicable but not
themselves causally determined. Although many of the external and internal
conditions of choice are inevitably fixed by the world and not under my control, some
range of open possibilities is generally presented to me on an occasion of action—and
when by acting I make one of those possibilities actual, the final explanation of this ...
is given by the intentional explanation of my action, which is comprehensible only
through my point of view. My reason for doing it is the whole reason why it happened,
and no further explanation is either necessary or possible.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
49. See Moore, supra note 23, at 1112–13.
50. Id.
51. Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval Animal Trial Can Teach
Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. 273, 276 (2011).
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While philosophers, theologians, scientists and lawyers have debated
for centuries whether such a thing as ‘free will’ really exists, society
and the law have no choice in the matter. We must proceed, until a
firm alternative is available, on the scientifically unprovable
assumption that human beings make choices in the regulation of their
conduct and that they are influenced by society’s standards as well as
by personal standards. We can, in the abstract, agree with Aquinas
that man ‘the framer of human law, is competent to judge only the
outward acts;
* * * God alone the framer of the divine law, is competent to judge
the inward movement of wills.52
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia makes a
suggestion reminiscent of Lincoln and Dostoevsky: it argues the courts must
hold to the notion of free will, not until the debate is resolved once and for all,
but “until a firm alternative is available.”53 This choice is pragmatic, reflecting
not a deep-seated ideology, but rather a tactical choice that free will is a
necessary condition for a working criminal justice system.54 In its decision, the
court explicitly recognizes the dependence of our criminal system on the idea of
free will. Even in the face of proof that physical determinism is true, the courts
must proceed on the assumption that free will exists until an alternative system
of justice not predicated on such a belief can be fashioned.
The United States Supreme Court has echoed the Blocker court in holding that
“[a] ‘universal and persistent’ foundation stone in our system of law, and
particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the
‘belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil.’”55 Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, writing for the Supreme Court, agreed: “Till now the law has been
guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a
working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”56 The fear of these courts
was expressed succinctly by the D.C. Circuit when it wrote, “In the
determination of guilt age old conceptions of individual moral responsibility
cannot be abandoned without creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines
the whole administration of criminal law.”57 The criminal law cannot give up a

52. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 866 (quoting Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 79–80
(1942) (“[T]he practical business of government and administration of the law is obliged to proceed
on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the assumption that mature and rational
persons are in control of their own conduct.”).
55. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (quoting Morrisette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)).
56. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
57. Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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belief in free will because the consequences would undermine the entire system,
which seeks to hold individuals accountable for their criminal actions.
Yet determinism has made inroads into American law, sometimes eliciting
fierce reaction from courts. The next Part of this Article will explore the insanity
defense as an area of the law where physical determinism has impacted the
practical application of our criminal system. It will show the sometimes violent
reactions of the legal system to encroachment by determinism, and will also
suggest determinism is a problem likely to persist. It would be better for our
courts and the society they protect to overcome doubts about determinism by
adopting a system not tied to robust conceptions of human free will.
II. DETERMINISM AT THE GATES
The tension felt by American jurists between deterministic accounts of the
universe, including human behavior, and the criminal law’s dedication to human
freedom are not limited to theoretical debates in academic journals. The debate
has time and again reared its head in the opinions of cases decided, at least in
part, on the basis of the metaphysical leanings of the judge in question.58 This
Part focuses on the insanity defense as an area of law where determinism has
had a profound impact. Such an account will animate the search, explained in
later Parts, for a system of criminal justice not vulnerable to determinism.
In the middle of the twentieth century, a panel of judges on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reevaluated the court’s test for
criminal insanity.59
Monte Durham had been convicted at trial of
housebreaking, and the trial judge had rejected Durham’s defense of insanity on
the basis that the defense had failed to establish at trial that Durham “didn’t know
the difference between right and wrong or that even if he did, he was subject to
an irresistible impulse by reason of the derangement of mind.”60 Writing for the
D.C. Circuit on review, Judge David Bazelon held that existing tests for insanity
were obsolete and inadequate to the then-current understandings of the mental
workings of the insane.61 The court went to great lengths to decry prevailing
tests, specifically the “right-wrong test[,]” then in force in that circuit, and the
“irresistible impulse” test referred to by the trial judge.62 In formulating a new
test, the court looked to the test for insanity adopted in New Hampshire in 1870,
which held “an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect.”63 The Durham test, which clearly

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See generally Cotton, supra note 28, at 1.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Id. at 864–65.
Id. at 869.
See id. at 869–74.
Id. at 874–75.
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seems to imply mental disease can cause actions, rather than simply influencing
the will of the criminal, would become an object of fierce contention.64
Durham was controversial from the beginning, but a majority of the D.C.
Circuit defeated a rehearing en banc which might have jeopardized the test.65
Judge Warren Burger expressed his disapproval for the Durham test in later
opinions, taking issue with the fact that Durham “assumed, without discussion,
that mental disease can ‘produce’ or cause criminal acts.”66 The test “operated
to reject the historic basis of criminal responsibility and to substitute something
resembling the ‘determinist’ thesis that man’s conduct is simply a manifestation
of irresistible psychological forces in which ethical and moral values and
standards play a small part, if any part.”67 Burger bristled at the absence of any
mention of a person’s capacity to make choices in the regulation of his behavior
from the Durham test.68 That was the traditional standard for criminal insanity:
whether a person was able to understand the criminal choice before him and able
to see it was wrong and avoidable.69 The Durham test instead asked jurors to
decide whether the act was directly caused by the mental disease.70
Durham was overruled in 1972,71 but not before it effected a 36-fold increase
in the number of successful insanity defenses in the D.C. Circuit.72 The
deterministic flavor of Durham seems, empirically, to have had a clear effect on
juries, given their increased willingness to acquit defendants when applying the
test.73 Like the judges presented with evidence of biomechanical causes of a
criminal’s actions, the jurors’ intuitions concerning moral blameworthiness
similarly may have been softened when they focused on whether the insanity
caused the criminal to behave as he or she did, rather than evaluating whether
the criminal’s will was overcome by the mental disease.74 This seems to confirm
Judge Bazelon’s own reasoning in adopting the Durham test—that the name we
put to a failure does matter, as noted by the increase in acquittals following the
Durham test75:
Evil, of course, can only be punished or forgiven. But illness is
supposed to be ameliorated or cured. Thus the name we put to our

64. See Cotton, supra note 28, at 5–9.
65. Durham, 214 F.2d at 876.
66. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 867.
68. Id. at 865.
69. Id.
70. Id. (“When it came to explaining to the jurors the standards they were to use, we see that
all reference to man’s capacity to make choices in regulating conduct or any connection between
the power to make choices and criminal responsibility was carefully eliminated.”).
71. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
72. Cotton, supra note 28, at 8.
73. See id.
74. See Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 847–48.
75. Cotton, supra note 28, at 8.
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failures makes a difference. We all tend to believe in free will when
we entertain hopes for the future, but switch to determinism when
recalling our past failures. I suggest we extend the same consideration
to the failures of others.76
When the emphasis is placed not on the criminal’s choice to commit a crime,
but rather on the causal role a mental disease may have played in the crime, then
intuitions concerning moral blameworthiness seem to diminish.
If nothing else, the history of the Durham test shows that how we frame
questions of human will and determinism have a profound practical impact on
the application of the law. It stands to reason, therefore, that a system which
could accommodate determinism, as Justice Burger clearly felt that our current
system cannot,77 would be less vulnerable to shifting beliefs favoring free will
on the one hand and determinism on the other.
III. SELF-DEFENSE AND “WEAK RETRIBUTIVISM”
Having attributed the apprehension felt within the criminal law to physical
determinism, the question then becomes: can a system which can address the
potential of determinism to undermine justifications for criminal punishment be
developed? Since it is exactly the belief in free will that determinism
undermines, at least in the minds of many, the more specific project is to
construct a system which does not rely on free will to measure culpability.78
Although there is much room for debate on the compatibility of free will and
determinism, assuming free will and determinism cannot coexist, is it possible
to develop a system of justice satisfactory to both? This Part considers what
Daniel Farrell calls the concept of “weak retributivism” as the potential basis for
such a system.79
In his article The Justification of General Deterrence, Farrell develops a
system of general deterrence he characterizes as a form of “weak retributivism,”
which is based on a theory of distributive justice.80 While Farrell uses the
example of self-defense against an unjust aggressor to develop this idea, Derk
Pereboom argues that Farrell’s theory may be justified even without the
existence of moral responsibility and free will and suggests extending Farrell’s
theory to one that can exist in a physically determined world without free will. 81
Thus, Farrell and Pereboom, together, provide a plausible system of criminal
76. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 868 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring)
(quoting David L. Bazelon, The Awesome Decision, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 23, 1960 at
56.).
77. See id. at 865 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (“[A]ll
law in Western civilization is ‘guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the
will as a working hypothesis in the solution of (legal) problems.’”).
78. See, e.g., id. at 876.
79. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 368.
80. Id.
81. See LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 168–74.
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justice which can satisfy determinists, who believe the lack of human free will
makes most criminal punishments unjustifiable, while simultaneously allaying
the courts’ fears that abandoning free will and moral responsibility would be
fatal to a robust system of criminal justice.
Farrell’s approach to general deterrence is grounded in the individual right to
both direct and indirect self-defense.82 Direct self-defense, as Farrell uses it, is
a person’s right to inflict the amount of harm needed to stop an unjust aggressor
from harming the victim in the face of a threat.83 Indirect self-defense is the
individual’s right to threaten to inflict harm in order to prevent an unjust
aggressor from harming the victim in the face of a threat.84 Farrell argues the
intuition that such acts of self-defense are justified is founded on a notion of
distributive justice.85 That is, if a harm is inevitable and we must choose whether
to allocate it to an innocent victim or an unjust aggressor, then it seems right to
allocate that harm to the unjust aggressor.86 Our criminal justice system already
has this feature: it protects the innocent against the acts of the unjust aggressor,
or criminal. Yet it is Farrell’s next movements that provide a practical
foundation to a system of general deterrence not dependent on the existence of
free will.
If our right to direct and indirect self-defense was limited to inflicting or
threatening to inflict the minimum harm needed to prevent an unjust aggressor’s
attack, then the application of this approach to a system of criminal justice where
the criminal is already in custody and incapacitated would seem questionable.87
Since the aggressor is no longer a threat, there does not seem to be any
justification to punish the person any longer on the grounds of self-defense.88
Self-defense, therefore, would be limited to cases of immediate danger, likely
only in the province of individual citizens and perhaps the police in their role of
protecting the innocent.89 Yet Farrell builds from our basic intuitions regarding
self-defense to a society-wide system of criminal justice which, he believes, rests
upon self-defense rather than more hard-to-defend notions of hard
retributivism.90 Farrell notes the difference between his system as thus:
And this, I shall say, is one version of the thesis of weak retributivism:
one must suffer, once one has done wrong, not (simply) because of
one’s decision to do wrong, as in classical or ‘fierce’ retributivism;
rather, one must suffer if one’s decision to do wrong makes it

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Farrell, supra note 37, at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id.
See LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 172.
Id.
Id.
See Farrell, supra note 37, at 370.
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necessary that someone must suffer and that sufferer must either be
the wrongdoer or some innocent victim.91
Farrell distinguishes between special and general deterrence, defining the
former as punishment inflicted to prevent the individual criminal from repeating
his crime and the latter as punishment inflicted to prevent the population at large
from committing the same type of crime or crimes in general.92 Special
deterrence, to Farrell, is the easier practice to justify—he argues that special
deterrence is really nothing more than the right of indirect self-defense exercised
at a societal level.93 General deterrence is harder to justify on Farrell’s account,
for how do we justify inflicting pain on an unjust aggressor when it is not to
prevent that aggressor’s actions but to prevent the actions of society at large?94
Unlike special deterrence, this practice seems unjustifiable on a theory of direct
and indirect self-defense, for we are not seeking to defend ourselves from the
aggressor’s actions, but rather, the feared actions of society at large.95 Why that
burden should fall upon the criminal as opposed to any other person in society
is not obvious at first blush.
Farrell argues that a practice of general deterrence can be developed from our
rights of direct and indirect self-defense.96 The justification hinges on the fact
that when a person commits a crime, in addition to the harm of the crime itself,
the criminal also harms society by making it more likely that others will commit
acts of that same kind.97 If this vulnerability of society to a greater amount of
crime is attributable to the actions of the criminal, then, Farrell argues, it is
justifiable to inflict the amount of harm on the criminal needed to counter that
vulnerability.98 This is just another aspect of the principle of distributive justice
at work in special deterrence.99
It is not immediately apparent how this system of self-defense based on
distributive justice could be applied to society at large. A person may have a
right to defend against unjust aggressors, but why that right should motivate a
penal system with the state as the distributor of punishment is unclear. Yet even
if the state could distribute punishments in this way, the principle of self-defense
discussed would only allow the state to impose the punishment needed to protect
society from the vulnerability introduced by the criminal’s actions. If, as the
almost-universal practice is amongst systems of criminal justice, uniform
systems of punishment are developed and applied to criminals in different
contexts, then this often may lead to criminals punished in excess of the amount
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 373.
Id. at 370, 373.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 373–75.
Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 386.
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of harm justified on self-defense grounds.100 Farrell takes up this question,
largely on grounds of administrability, and his discussion will become central to
the next Part of this Article, which will examine the broad outlines of a system
of criminal justice founded on Farrell’s principles.101
Farrell maintains his system, based on a principle of distributive justice, is a
form of what might be called “weak retributivism.”102 This is because “one’s
wrongful choices make one liable, morally, to treatment to which one would
ordinarily not be liable.”103 Thus, a criminal is liable to punishment because of
his actions: the wrongdoer is simply receiving his deserts. This approach to
general deterrence has the benefit of avoiding the pitfall inherent in many
utilitarian-based systems, as the system cannot justify punishing an innocent
person even if such punishment would benefit society at large.104 This system
of general deterrence, founded on common-sense notions of the right of selfdefense, only justifies punishing those who unjustifiably harm members of
society or society as a whole.105
Yet Farrell’s account is predicated on self-defense where the criminal is an
unjust aggressor.106 His account “presupposes that the wrongdoer in question is
both causally and morally responsible for [society’s] increased vulnerability to
others’ wrongdoing.”107 His view, then, seems unavailable if we are searching
for a basis for criminal justice not reliant on free will. In Living Without Free
Will, however, Derk Pereboom argues that Farrell’s principles can be put on a
“hard incompatabilist” footing which rejects free will and accepts physical
determinism.108
Pereboom argues for the position of “hard incompatibilism” – the view that
“freedom of the sort required for moral responsibility is incompatible with
determinism” – because human actions and choices are determined by external
forces.109 Though he finds some accounts of free will are coherent in
themselves, Pereboom views the existence of free will as empirically unlikely.110
After making the case for hard incompatibilism and rejecting the existence of
moral responsibility, Pereboom turns to the consequences of such a view on

100. Id. at 387, 392.
101. Id. at 392.
102. Id. at 368.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 371.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 385.
108. See generally LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 168–74.
109. Id. at 127.
110. Id. at 129 (“I have argued . . . that there is one indeterminist position—agent-causal
libertarianism—that yields a coherent conception of human morally responsible agency, and that it
might well be possible for us to be agent-causes.”).
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human life and institutions.111 In the context of criminal behavior, after ruling
out retributivism as incompatible with determinism,112 Pereboom examines
Farrell’s argument in The Justification of General Deterrence as a possible
means of motivating a system of criminal justice.113
It is not obvious, Pereboom argues, that the right to self-defense is triggered
only by attacks by an unjust aggressor.114 Most of us would agree that a victim
can defend himself from an attack whether the attacker is morally responsible or
not —even if the attacker is compelled to attack, such as instances of
psychopathy or involuntary movement.115 Of course, in such instances, the
victim should inflict the minimum amount of harm needed to deter the threat,
but this is just the system for which Farrell argues.116 Thus, if Pereboom is right
and the right to self-defense is not dependent on the blameworthiness of an
attacker, then everything Farrell has argued can be of use even if the attacker is
not morally blameworthy for his actions.117 As Pereboom explains:
[A] Farrell-style deterrence theory is grounded in the powerful moral
intuitions that underlie the right to harm in self-defense. Since – at
least initially – this right would seem to be ours even if hard
incompatibilism were true, it would appear that the hard
incompatibilist could avail himself of Farrell’s theory in arguing for
the legitimacy of criminal punishment. Then he might not be at a
disadvantage with respect to the competing positions in justifying an
effective response to criminal behavior.118
Thus Pereboom puts Farrell’s theory of general deterrence on a footing which
can exist in a deterministic world. Though Farrell developed his system on the
grounds of punishing a morally blameworthy attacker, we see that his system
can also justify punishing an attacker who is not morally blameworthy, or who
lacks free will entirely.119 Beginning with the fundamental right of self-defense,
one can fashion a system of general deterrence based not just on punishing to
prevent the criminal from committing his crime again (special deterrence) but
also on punishing to address the added vulnerability any criminal act contributes
to society. If we must choose between inflicting harm on society or a criminal
(who is, by admission, not responsible for his crime), then we may choose to

111. See id. at 158, 187.
112. Id. at 159–61.
113. Id. at 168–69.
114. Id. at 169.
115. Id. at 170.
116. Farrell, supra note 37, at 387-88. See also LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38,
at 171–72 (summarizing Farrell’s argument).
117. LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 160–70.
118. Id. at 171.
119. Id. at 170.
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inflict that harm on the criminal without thereby blaming him for his actions.120
John Wigmore articulated a similar view in 1924:
The measures of the modern penal law are not based on moral blame,
but on social self-defense. When there is a weed in your garden, and
you cut it down, you do not do this on any theory of the moral blame
of the weed, but simply on the theory that you are entitled to keep
weeds out of your garden. Society is entitled to use appropriate
measures to repress antisocial acts. Society’s right of self-defense is
equally valid even when the human weed was predetermined by nature
and environment to do just what he did.121
Pereboom and Farrell, together, provide the basis for a system of criminal
justice not dependent on free will. We punish the criminal not because he is
responsible for his actions, but because we must choose between a harm
befalling the criminal or the society. Part IV will explore a means of
implementing a criminal justice system based on the system discussed here.
IV. THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE
Part III explored a theory of criminal deterrence based on the right to selfdefense. This Part will draw the broad outlines of how such a system might look
in practice as an alternative to the current system of criminal punishment. It
begins by discussing how Farrell makes the movement from individual selfdefense to a society-wide regime of general deterrence. It then turns to a
discussion of how Farrell’s system can be adapted to a system free of moral
blame and along the lines of Pereboom’s discussion in Living Without Free
Will.122
As noted in Part III, it is unclear how Farrell’s theory of general deterrence,
founded as it is on the individual right of self-defense, could motivate a system
of criminal justice where the state threatens to, and actually does, impose
punishment to criminals for their actions when those criminals are already in
120. Following his discussion of Farrell’s theory, Pereboom raises the possibility that Farrell’s
theory of general deterrence is actually retributive in nature. If this concern is correct, then it would
render Farrell’s system unavailable to our project, because such a system would maintain our
current criminal justice system’s dependence on free will. See LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra
note 38, at 172. Yet it does not seem that just because we choose the criminal as the object of
punishment we are committing ourselves to his blameworthiness. As between society at large and
the individual criminal, it may just be that society chooses to punish the criminal because he or she
presents the more convenient and consistent means of deterring crime, and that even if the criminal
is not morally responsible for his or her crime. Such a choice may run afoul of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.’s view that “[t]he general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where
it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of
misfortune.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 64 (1881).
121. Harry Olson, Homer Cummings, & John H. Wigmore, A Symposium of Comments from
the Legal Profession: The Loeb-Leopold Case (Concluded), 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 404 (1924).
122. LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL, supra note 38, at 160–70.
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custody and, therefore, no longer pose an imminent threat to society. If that
system takes the form of a uniform schedule of punishments imposed for various
crimes, it does not seem that Farrell’s system, which seems to require an
individualized response to each criminal act, can be of aid. Yet Farrell deals
with both of these objections in turn, basing his answer in part on the more
feasible administrability of a schedule of punishments than a system that
individualizes punishments to individual cases.123
Farrell deals with two branches of this objection separately: first, what
justifies the state in threatening to punish people for certain classes of action,
and second, what justifies the state in carrying out those punishments when a
criminal commits one of the prohibited acts.124 In the first instance, Farrell’s
argument is pragmatic. He recognizes a uniform system of threats akin to a
criminal code may be objected to on the grounds that it will often times threaten
people more than is necessary to deter them from that crime.125 For instance,
most of us, it seems, do not need the threat of the death penalty to deter us from
murder. Why, then, is the state justified in threatening us all in this way, rather
than merely threatening those who are likely to commit murder but for the threat
of punishment? Farrell imagines a “very simple social setting” where it would
be possible to issue specific threats of this sort.126 Yet in a large society like our
own, the implementation of such a system would require us to “construct, at
incalculable expense, an unimaginable bureaucracy that does nothing but issue
particular threats to particular people.”127 The choice seems obvious: if we must
issue general threats of punishment or face having no criminal code at all, Farrell
argues it is reasonable to believe we are justified in issuing the general threats.128
Assuming that individuals of a society have a general entitlement to be free
from criminal activity, Farrell’s suggestion may be characterized as a preference
for a liability rule of entitlement as it applies to criminal activity, rather than a
property rule of entitlement.129 Calabresi and Melamed famously argued that
liability rules—rules where “someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it”—are preferable in
environments where fixing the value of an entitlement to its owner is either
difficult or exceedingly costly.130 In the criminal context, ideally, the state
would threaten each individual in society with only the amount of punishment

123. Farrell, supra note 37, at 379–81.
124. Id. at 379–80.
125. Id. at 380.
126. Id. at 380–81.
127. Id. at 381. This discussion does not touch the Equal Protection Clause and other
constitutional objections that might be raised against such a system.
128. Id.
129. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (differentiating
between two types of rules of entitlements: property rules and liability rules).
130. Id. at 1092, 1106–07.
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needed to deter that individual from crime; in reality, however, it would be
extraordinarily cumbersome for the state to determine such individual values
across society, even assuming a reasonably accurate method of measurement
existed, and that seems unlikely.131 In such a case, therefore, it seems reasonable
for the state to make a general estimate of the punishment needed to deter
criminals and protect the entitlement.132 As Calabresi and Melamed note,
“liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention: not only are
entitlements protected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of
a value determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties
themselves.”133 The generally issued threats proposed by Farrell are just this
sort of state-determined, general estimate of the value of the cost of crime.134
Farrell then turns to a justification for actually implementing the threatened
punishments when a person commits one of the proscribed acts.135 Farrell notes
that, at times, punishing a person according to the general threat may lead to a
punishment that is greater than necessary to deter that criminal from behaving
criminally in the future.136 This seems like improperly using the criminal for the
good of society—something we want to avoid if we are to remain uncommitted
to the moral blameworthiness of the criminal because it seems to imply the
criminal is vulnerable to punishment of this kind because it is deserved.137
Farrell’s response to this objection is to introduce his theory of general
deterrence: we are justified in punishing the criminal above the amount needed
to deter his criminal threat because someone, either the criminal or society at
large, must bear the increased vulnerability to crime the criminal has introduced
by his action.138 We are justified in punishing criminals according to the
generally issued threats if society has established those punishments as an
estimate of the amount of vulnerability the criminal act exposes to society.139
Farrell proposes important limiting criteria which would stand as upper and
lower limits on the amount of punishment that can rightly be dispensed under
such a regime.140 First, Farrell argues an important limiting principle can be
found in the fact that, because it is based on a theory of self-defense, his system
only justifies doing no more “than we have to do in order to protect ourselves
against the harms made likely by any given wrongdoer’s attack.”141 Thus, if a
criminal threatens to or actually does commit a minor battery, most people
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Farrell, supra note 37, at 381–82.
Id. at 381. See also Calabresi, supra note 129, at 1092.
Calabresi, supra note 129, at 1092.
See Farrell, supra note 37, at 381.
See id. at 381–83.
Id. at 382.
Id.
See id. at 383–85.
See id. at 384–85.
See id. at 387–92.
Id. at 389.
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would not find that killing the attacker would be a proportionate response.142
How punishments will be fitted to certain types of crimes under this principle is,
for Farrell, an empirical matter estimating the harm that would be done to society
at large by the criminal’s actions if punishment was not imposed.143 Such a
determination may be difficult, and estimates of this kind may often seem
capricious or arbitrary. Yet fitting punishments to crimes is something our laws
and courts regularly do, and it does not seem that such a determination would be
any different than fixing the punishment a criminal “deserves” in our current,
largely retributive system.
The second limiting principle is more criminal-specific than crime-specific.144
Though we may make efforts to estimate the harms differing classes of crimes
impose upon society, the theory of self-defense is very context-specific.145 We
are justified, on this theory, only in imposing the punishment necessary to
prevent the harms stemming from the criminal’s actions; since, in most cases,
the threat of actual harm will have passed by the time the criminal is punished,
the courts will have to impose punishment commensurate with the needs of
special and general deterrence.146 Farrell calls these “case-relative” limits “a
posteriori” because they are not readily predictable: we can only divine the harm
any criminal has done after he has done, or sought to do, that harm.147 We are
again faced with the demand of tailoring every punishment imposed to the
specific harm done by any particular criminal, and the “unimaginable
bureaucracy” fears that Farrell discussed earlier in his article resurface.148
Yet there seem to be two responses available to these a posteriori limits.149
First, as Farrell suggests, if the right to self-defense is a right to do what is
reasonably necessary to defend oneself and if requiring an individualized
response rather than a society-wide schedule of penalties is unreasonable, then
we seem to be justified in taking the reasonable step of normalizing the system
of punishments across society based on a good-faith empirical estimate of the
harms different types of crimes introduce.150 Second, it seems the ability to
custom-tailor a punishment to the particular harm of a criminal’s action already
exists within our system because of the discretion afforded to trial judges in
sentencing. The Science study demonstrates just this point: judges confronted
with certain deterministic evidence at sentencing tended to find such evidence
mitigating and to impose lesser sentences accordingly.151 While a harm-based
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 389–90.
Id.
Id. at 390–93.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 381.
See id. at 392.
Id.
Aspinwall, supra note 3, at 846.
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system of sentencing would need to be recalibrated to accord with our revised
penalogical goals within this system, it does not demand anything not already in
practice in our current justice system.152
Introducing Pereboom’s interpretation of Farrell’s system at this point raises
a very important question to be resolved if we are to rest our system upon
Farrell’s weak retributivism: avoiding, as we are, that any person is morally
responsible for his actions, how do we make room for defenses based on mental
incapacity, infancy, compulsion, and the like? These defenses have traditionally
rested upon our intuitions regarding the degree of moral responsibility
attributable to a person’s conduct.153 But if no one is morally responsible in this
sense, then our traditional categories threaten to fall apart. The reasoning of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Freeman would seem to
apply to every person:
What rehabilitative function is served when one who is mentally
incompetent and found guilty is ordered to serve a sentence in prison?
Is not any curative or restorative function better achieved in such a
case in an institution designed and equipped to treat just such
individuals? And how is deterrence achieved by punishing the
incompetent? Those who are substantially unable to restrain their
conduct are, by definition, undeterrable and their ‘punishment’ is no
example for others; those who are unaware of or do not appreciate the
nature and quality of their actions can hardly be expected rationally to
weigh the consequences of their conduct. Finally, what segment of
society can feel its desire for retribution satisfied when it wreaks
vengeance upon the incompetent? Although an understandable
emotion, a need for retribution can never be permitted in a civilized
society to degenerate into a sadistic form of revenge.154
Under our theory, are all people not “substantially unable to restrain their
conduct” if that conduct is determined not by a will that is free, but by physical
laws working toward predictable and unavoidable outcomes?155
The discussion of the insanity defense above serves as a valuable proxy for
our discussion here.156 Alan Stone argues the “involuntariness” of the insane
person’s actions is what makes him morally blameless.157
We can readily acquiesce to this view of insanity and moral culpability
without undermining our system, for we are not punishing the criminal because
152. Farrell, supra note 37, at 392–93.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (opining
that “[t]he concept of lack of ‘free will’ is both the root of the insanity defense and the line of its
growth”).
154. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966).
155. Id.
156. See generally, Cotton, supra note 28, at 1.
157. Alan Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 636, 640
(1982).
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he is culpable, but only because we choose, as a matter of societal self-defense,
to harm the criminal rather than have that harm be borne by society at large.158
Yet retaining defenses like insanity seems important even if we are discarding
the notion of free will as the animating basis of our criminal justice system. How
can we effectively differentiate the insane person from those we would punish
on our account?
V. EXCUSING EXCUSES
As suggested in the previous Part, an obvious difficulty for a system based on
weak retributivism is how to maintain the division between those who are
punished for their crimes and those who are excused because of some mitigating
factor. One common means of differentiation is between those acts chosen (or
caused) by the criminal versus those caused by factors outside of the criminal’s
control; this is unavailable to us, however, if we are to avoid assuming free
will.159 If we are to avoid running afoul of determinism at this point, we cannot
base our system of excuse on the causal origins of a crime, for every action of
the criminal is caused by external factors outside of his control.160 This presents
a difficulty because, at least at a superficial level, many of the excuse defenses
within the criminal law seem founded on the very notions of free will that we
are seeking to avoid.161
The excuses, and our general conceptual framework for attributing blame in
American law, generally adhere to a causal model of responsibility.162 On a
causal account, we distinguish acts that may appear criminal but are caused by
unchosen influences on the accused person from crimes that are chosen and
fairly attributable to the criminal.163 Excuses like duress, necessity, addiction,
insanity, and infancy all seek to divide actions of a criminal nature from those
caused by outside or alien influences on a person.164 The Durham test, while
controversial for seeming to assume physical determinism, adhered to this view
of crime, asking whether the criminal act was caused by the criminal or by his
mental disease.165 Acts caused by forces outside the control of the actor cannot
be criminal because they are not properly morally ascribable to the actor.166 And
if an act is not morally ascribable to a person, it would be inappropriate to punish

158. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 384–86.
159. See Pillsbury, supra note 24, at 730–31 (“[T]he approach builds on the common intuition
that, while persons are generally responsible for their own character, extraordinary environmental
or genetic influences may preclude such responsibility.”).
160. Moore, supra note 23, at 1112–14.
161. See Pillsbury, supra note 24, at 744–45.
162. See id. at 730–32.
163. Id. at 730–31.
164. See Moore, supra note 23, at 1098–1100.
165. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
166. Pillsbury, supra note 24, at 730–31.
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the person for that act.167 H.L.A. Hart describes this free will grounding of our
system of justice:
[M]ost lawyers, laymen and moralists, considering the legal doctrine
of mens rea and the excuses that the law admits, would conclude that
what the law has done here is to reflect, albeit imperfectly, a
fundamental principle of morality that a person is not to be blamed for
what he has done if he could not help doing it. This is how Blackstone
at the beginning of modern legal history looked at the various excuses
which the law accepted. He said they were accepted because ‘the
concurrence of the will when it has its choice either to do or avoid the
act in question’ is the only thing that renders human actions
praiseworthy or culpable.168
Such an account runs afoul of our system, for it seems to rest criminal liability
on whether an act is causally ascribable to an actor’s free choice.169 This means
of differentiating culpable criminal acts from those which are excused cannot be
made on the assumption that all actions are externally determined.170 While the
causal model is not itself inconsistent with physical determinism, it threatens to
excuse all crime.171 For if all crimes caused by external factors are excused, and
we concede the determinist’s point that all human behavior is caused by external
factors, then it seems to follow that all acts should be excused from
punishment.172 If our system is to withstand deterministic accounts of human
behavior and still punish some crime, then it must find an alternative means of
excusing crime—a workable picture of the causal account rests on free will
assumptions inconsistent with our system.173
In addition to the practical disadvantages of the causal model, there are
independent reasons to doubt its accuracy in describing the legal excuses. As
Michael Moore argues in his work Causation and the Excuses, the causal model
does not fit as a theory of legal excuse.174 Moore makes this point using the
example of duress.175 No jurisdiction, Moore argues, has adopted a test of duress
that merely asks whether an external threat caused the person to act in a criminal
matter.176 Rather, the test always ties the excuse of duress to whether a
reasonable person would have been overcome by the threat.177 The focus,
167.
168.
(1968).
169.
170.
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172.
173.
174.
175.
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H.L.A. HART, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 174
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therefore, is on whether the practical reasoning faculties of the threatened person
were compromised by the threat, not whether the threat caused the crime
(whatever that might mean).178 The causal model is over-inclusive as an account
of the excuse of duress.179
This is apparent if we return to the Durham test. While the Durham test was
cast in terms of the causal role played by the mental disease, the true issue in any
insanity defense is whether the rational capacities of the person affected were so
compromised that the person lacked the capacity to make a reasoned choice.180
Moore argues that no matter what tests may be applied, the test for insanity, as
applied by testifying mental health experts and by juries, focuses not on a causal
account of the crime but rather on whether the person afflicted could make a
reasoned decision at the time of the act.181 Thus, in addition to being undermined
by determinism,182 an account of the excuses that turns on the causal model fails
to accurately capture the rationale exercised in excusing a crime.183
What is really at the heart of our theories of excuse is a determination of
whether the accused was capable of exercising a rational choice free of
coercion.184 Evidence of insanity, of duress, or other coercive or influencing
factors only serves to establish that a person’s rational faculties were
compromised in a way that excuses.185 Moore sums this view up, writing, “[i]n
one or another of these ways, our legal and moral excuses all reflect the moral
judgment that responsibility can only be ascribed to an individual who has both
the capacity and the opportunity to exercise the practical reasoning that is
distinctive of his personhood.”186 Focusing on the human rational faculty, which
is not subject to doubt in the same way as the human capacity for free will, such
an account of excuse is not undermined by determinism in the way that the
causal model was.187
This method of accounting for excuse is also coherent with the system
described above, resting, as it does, on notions of self-defense and a general
system of punishments that seeks to deter criminal activity.188 While no one
may bear moral responsibility, given Farrell’s understanding of general
deterrence, there is nothing inconsistent in excusing some harmful acts because
the actor’s rational faculties were compromised at the time of their criminal
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Id. at 1149.
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activity.189 The focus is not on whether the person’s actions were caused by
external factors, for it may well be that all actions are so caused.190 Rather, we
ask whether, in making his decision, the actor was possessed of the rational
faculties requisite for considered human choice.191 Since a person who lacks
rational capacity does not seem deterrable, if such faculties were compromised
or absent, then we excuse that actor from punishment.192 This distinction may
not bear the deep moral resonance that causal accounts bear, but it is not
threatened by a widespread belief in physical determinism in the ways that a
causal account is.193
VI. CONCLUSION
Beginning from an account of the universal right to self-defense, a system of
general deterrence can be constructed that does not require belief in free will.194
Such a view is compatible with a belief in physical determinism, even a physical
determinism that precludes free will and, consequently, blameworthiness for
crime.195 Such a system punishes the criminal not because he deserves to be
punished in a moral sense, but because the negative effects of the crime must
either rest with the criminal or with society itself.196 Society may choose, on
this account, to deter crime through the punishment of criminal acts.197 Upon
this general scheme, an account of excuse can be constructed that depends not
on the causal origins of the crime, but on whether the criminal was possessed of
his rational faculties at the time the criminal act was committed and was not
coerced in the decision to perform the criminal act.198 Such a theory of excuse
logically fits with our general theory of excuse, perhaps more aptly than the
causal model,199 and can be justified on the grounds that there seems little benefit
in attempting to deter those who chose a crime in a moment of coercion or during
the loss of rational faculties.
Consciousness of free will or its absence has a peculiar character: though it
changes nothing about our world, it changes everything about how we perceive
that world. Even if society grants that there is no free will, the individuals
composing that society will continue to behave as though they are free. They
will weigh options in making rational choices which will then motivate their
actions, all the while knowing that they are not the “author” of those actions. In
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this way the problem of free will is much like the problem of absurdity: even if
society admitted that human existence is, ultimately, meaningless, and that the
seriousness with which the individuals in that society engage in our lives is
absurd, individuals would continue to engage in their lives in a serious way.
Albert Camus believed that confronting the question of absurdity was
inextricably linked to the question of suicide: if human beings are absurd and
cannot escape such a state in living, why not escape living entirely?200 Yet other
philosophers, Thomas Nagel amongst them, have argued that recognizing our
absurdity need not lead to such an extreme outcome: it should give way instead
to a humble irony in our approach to life.201 After the recognition of absurdity,
the whole color of life will change, even as it remains much the same in action.202
The apprehension that courts feel towards determinism can be akin to
Camus’s fear concerning the absurd; the courts believe accepting determinism
would mean suicide for criminal justice.203 Yet such a calamitous outcome
hardly seems necessary. Rather than resist determinism, as courts have done,204
we can attempt to mediate the divide between free will and determinism by
developing a criminal justice system that depends on neither. While this work
has been cursory and the issues constituting this debate are manifold, this Article
modestly attempts to suggest a foundation for criminal justice free of the
ideological underpinnings that are threatened by a widespread acceptance of
physical determinism. I do not wade into the controversy between those who
believe in human free will and those who do not; I merely address an issue that
must be addressed in either case: what do we do about criminal behavior in our
society?
Our courts defend the rights of the many against the aggressions of the few.
This role is indispensable in an ordered society. Yet if our courts turn from the
work of punishing the criminal as a wrongdoer and simply look to inflict the
punishment needed both to deter the criminal from further crime and to
safeguard society from the vulnerability that criminal activity creates, we can
continue effective criminal punishment free of the nagging fear that a criminal,
like a meteor or a tree, is just a product of his environment and should not be
blamed for his actions. And this is not a small thing to achieve.
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